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ABSTRACT – While the European Union (EU) is facing a further aggravation of the recession, 
accompanied by the consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis, the support for economic activities 
is proving to be more than necessary. Primary concerns of member states must be based on increased 
efforts in competitiveness, employment, innovation, and assistance for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME), to boost economic growth on a short-term basis or on a longer-term horizon. In 
this regard, this article firstly suggests that the temporary support for economic activities is absolutely 
necessary and the possible arrangements are examined in detail. In addition, more emphasis must be 
put on innovation, as it plays a crucial role for economic growth. Particular attention is also drawn to 
SMEs, their potential impact on the productive fabric and their financial constraints. The concluding 
remarks are focused on the European market size, and the antagonism between competition policy and 
industrial policy is highlighted.  
 
KEY WORDS: economic growth, European Union, innovation, small and medium-sized 
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Introduction 
In the light of some historical macroeconomic results that are deemed unsatisfactory and 
the current economic policies, one can confirm that growth is not a high-priority for 
European Union (EU) and its member states. The evidence is obvious for them, especially 
since it is within the competence of the countries themselves to reduce unemployment, as 
stated in the Treaties. Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal illustrate the singular and important 
obstinacy of fiscal orthodoxy among most Southern European countries (as well as France), 
leading them to a vicious circle of recession, and even depression. Concerning the EU (the 
level at which we are developing the following reflection), the situation is similar. In the 
framework of financial assistance mechanisms, and more generally the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), the balancing of public accounts has become a central obsession for both the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB). However, the Union and its 
member states have not always been as little concerned about economic growth, both at the 
cyclical level as well as the structural level.  
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Firstly, at the time of the Great Recession of 2008-2009, the necessity of an economic boost 
in Europe was shared by nearly all members. The Commission, clearly convinced that the 
poor economic circumstances resulted from a shortfall in demand, wanted to promote fiscal 
policies inspired by Keynesian thought. Conscious that the EU budget, in terms of financial 
means (capped at 1.27% of EU GDP), was not adapted to a quick and massive economic 
recovery effort through demand, the Commission worked on coordinating national 
economic stimulus plans and ensuring their consistency in all member states. By avoiding 
free riding behaviors, the Commission will also modestly contribute to the overall endeavor 
in terms of expenditures.  
Secondly, at the structural level, the Commission has been the lynchpin of the Lisbon 
strategy since 2000. With very high ambitions in terms of competitiveness, research and 
development (R&D), employment and growth in Europe2, the failure of the Lisbon strategy 
has been sufficiently explored to not dwell on it3. However, European authorities have 
deemed necessary to give it a direct continuation in the early years of this decade through 
the Europe 2020 strategy. Even though we cannot explain why the new initiative would 
ignore its predecessor's mistakes (lack of cohesion between the national policies, inadequate 
range of incentive and coercive tools, weak governance), it is a laudable desire. Concerns 
related to growth potential in the Union seem unquestionably well founded. 
The following work is based on the belief that economic growth must take the priority in 
European public policies, both for the Union and its member states, at the cyclical level as 
well as the structural level. Furthermore, we are of the view that there is no inherent 
incompatibility between supporting aggregate demand in the short-term and strengthening 
growth potential in the medium- to long-term. To support these beliefs, we emphasize that it 
has become an absolute necessity to quickly bolster economic activity in Europe (section 2). 
We recall that a growth strategy can also be an effective process for a public-sector 
deleveraging. In a third section, we discuss the possible modus operandi of a demand 
stimulus, which leads us to favor some forms of public investment. In a fourth section, we 
emphasize the role of innovation as a key driver of economic growth.  We will then focus on 
the incorporation of small and medium-sized enterprises – following the example of the 
German Mittelstand – within the productive fabric of Europe (section 5). Lastly, as 
concluding remarks, we will focus on the European market size and the exploitation of 
possible scale effects. 
A Temporary support to economic growth 
The analysis of the EU macroeconomic path since the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis 
is relatively easy. This is particularly true in the Euro area. What is intriguing is the 
incapability of main economic policy actors (member states, European commission, ECB, 
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3
 The midterm “Kok report” (2004) had already provided a severe and worrying conclusion regarding 
the ambitious objectives of the Lisbon strategy and the efficiency of the “open method of 
coordination”. 
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IMF for countries under financial assistance) to make the proper diagnosis and to find the 
appropriate remedy. 
 
Table 1. GDP Growth 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
EU 2.2% 3.4% 3.2% 0.4% -4.5% 2.0% 1.6% -0.4% 0.1% 
France 1.8% 2.5% 2.3% -0.1% -3.1% 1.7% 2.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Germany 0.7% 3.7% 3.3% 1.1% -5.1% 4.0% 3.3% 0.7% 0.4% 
United Kingdom 3.2% 2.8% 3.4% -0.8% -5.2% 1.7% 1.1% 0.3% 1.7% 
Finland 2.9% 4.4% 5.3% 0.3% -8.5% 3.4% 2.8% -1.0% -1.4% 
Spain 3.6% 4.1% 3.5% 0.9% -3.8% -0.2% 0.1% -1.6% -1.2% 
Greece 2.3% 5.5% 3.5% -0.2% -3.1% -4.9% -7.1% -7.0% -3.9% 
Ireland 6.1% 5.5% 5.0% -2.2% -6.4% -1.1% 2.2% 0.2% -0.3% 
Portugal 0.8% 1.4% 2.4% 0.0% -2.9% 1.9% -1.3% -3.2% -1.4% 
United States 3.4% 2.7% 1.8% -0.3% -2.8% 2.5% 1.8% 2.8% 1.9% 
Japan 1.3% 1.7% 2.2% -1.0% -5.5% 4.7% -0.5% 1.4% 1.6% 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The Great Recession of 2008-2009 is undoubtedly a demand-side crisis, and not a supply-
side problem, as Krugman (2009) underlined at an early stage. Banking and financial 
problems raised by the subprime mortgage crisis have spread to the mainstream economy, 
through a credit crunch and negative wealth effects caused by the collapse of some asset 
markets. From these observations, fairly consensual, Keynesian stimulus plans have 
emerged, as mentioned in the introduction.  
These plans to support aggregate demand have produced the expected effects. On one 
hand, economic activity did not decline dramatically as it did during the 1930’s Great 
Depression and on the other hand, the early stages of economic recovery have appeared in 
2010 (see table 1). However, the turning point concerning fiscal policies has proved to be 
disastrous in the EU, and particularly in the Euro area. These policies have prematurely 
prioritized a return to equilibrium of public accounts, with the aim of reducing sovereign 
debt. The consequences were immediate. Deprived of the support of public expenditure, the 
economic activity slowed down and declined nearly the entire Euro area. This was 
particularly true in countries under the Troika’s supervision (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). 
Because of market pressure and European budgetary rules, this also occurred in other 
countries, which were hoping for a budgetary consolidation (Spain, Italy).  
The turning point concerning fiscal policy stance in Europe naturally coincides with the 
outbreak of the Greek crisis at the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. At that time, the 
historical high level of public debt in the European monetary union (EMU) appeared to be an 
invalidating phenomenon that prohibits maintaining expansionary economic policies. This 
argument is a red herring in several ways. 
The average debt (as a percentage of GDP) is higher in the United States or in the United 
Kingdom than in Europe, not to mention Japan. The problem stems less from the debt itself 
than its cost, largely determined by mimetic capital markets, and the institutional structure 
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of the Euro area, which is not a federal government. In this context, it needs to be taken into 
consideration that EMU member states acquire debt in a currency other than their domestic 
currency. Furthermore, the Euro area countries are under the auspices of a central bank other 
than their official lender of last resort, unlike the Federal Reserve in the United States or the 
Bank of England in the United Kingdom.  
 
Table 2. Unemployment in Europe, percentage 
 
 
Moreover, from a macroeconomic perspective, the well-known fact that a growth 
initiative might be a valuable debt reduction strategy is neglected by European authorities. 
The historical example of the United Kingdom's experience after the Second World War 
proves it. The country had emerged from the worldwide conflict with a massive sovereign 
debt (more than 200% of GDP) but had succeeded to reduce it through three steps – that are 
ignored by contemporary Mediterranean Europe. The first element is moderate inflation (4 to 
8% per year) that erodes the real value of the debt4. The second one is time frame: the public 
debt of the UK returned to acceptable levels not after a few years, but several decades later. 
Finally, the strong growth registered during the post-war economic boom had led decisively 
to reduce the sovereign debt ratio. 
The famous equation that links this ratio (dt) to the primary government balance (bt as a 
percentage of GDP), GDP growth (g) and to the average interest rate on debt (it) sums up 
itself the macroeconomic debate in the Euro area (see box 1). Those Krugman (2012) calls 
“the austerians” seek to reduce in priority the primary budget balance (bt), while hoping that 
capital markets will approve this – orthodox – choice with lower interest rates (it). The Italian 
– and even further the Spanish – experience demonstrates that the success of this policy is by 
no means guaranteed. In addition, these countries have exacerbated unemployment (see 
table 2) and, by doing so, they have reduced their growth potential, as a long period out of 
the job market plays a strong role in de-training and de-motivating employees. 
Conversely, a policy to exit the debt crisis would offer a twofold advantage. It would seek 
to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio without depending excessively on global finance – nor be 
limited to future fiscal balances with a deadly policy spiral of “austerity-recession-reinforced 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EU 9.0 8.2 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.6 10.4 10.8
France 8.9 8.9 8.0 7.5 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.8 10.3
Germany 11.3 10.3 8.7 7.5 7.8 7.1 5.9 5.5 5.3
United Kingdom 4.8 5.4 5.3 5.6 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.5
Finland 8.4 7.7 6.9 6.4 8.2 8.4 7.8 7.7 8.2
Spain 9.2 8.5 8.2 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1
Ireland 4.4 4.5 4.7 6.4 12.0 13.9 14.7 14.7 13.1
United States 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.3 9.6 8.9 8.1 7.4
Japan 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.0 5.1 5.1 4.6 4.3 4.0
Source: Eurostat
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austerity” – and it will help to provoke demand stimulus that is requested by a majority of 
macroeconomists.  
 
Box 1. The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
Let Dt denote a country's public debt at year t. Yt refers to its GDP, it stands for the 
interest rates on debt and Bt is the primary budget balance (excluding interest expenditure 
and with B>0 indicating a surplus). By construction, public debt is as follows:  
Dt = Dt-1 + it . Dt-1 – Bt  
The evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio is given by: 
 =   (1 + it) –  
We use lowercase letters to refer to GDP ratios and g represents growth rate. 
dt = dt-1 .  - bt 
All other things remaining equal, the debt ratio decreases in case of primary surpluses (bt 
> 0). However, its dynamic is also governed by the comparison between the economy's 
growth rate and the interest rate on debt. As long as it is less than g, the debt ratio may 
decrease, even without primary surpluses.  
Conversely, when the cost of debt is below the growth rate, the ratio can increase even 
with an equilibrium on the primary budget balance (known as the snowball effect). The 
necessary surpluses to simply stabilize dt become increasingly higher. 
 
In the following discussion, we examine in what extent a strategy in favor of economic 
growth could be organized in the Euro area. We also demonstrate how it should be 
accompanied by a structural policy designed to enhance potential growth.  
A Growth strategy coordinating short and long term objectives 
The first obstacle, unfavorable to Keynesian policies in Europe, is the weak 
macroeconomic governance system in the Euro area. Ineffective during normal times, it 
becomes a tremendous handicap when a serious crisis occurs. It should be noted that there is 
an apparent lack of authority and reactivity of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(Ecofin) and the Eurogroup. The macroeconomic decision-making process itself is lacking in 
the Euro area. This is a serious concern, and it is perceived as such by main partners5. The 
total absence of exchange rate policy illustrates this fact ably (Kauffmann 2013). 
More fundamentally, the fiscal policy framework of member states is problematic. 
Concerning the SGP, even though it requires an appropriate monitoring of sovereign debt 
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ratios, it has capped public deficits at 3% of GDP in a caricatural manner. In addition to the 
fact that this threshold percentage has no serious macroeconomic justification, it applies to a 
balance that is not adjusted for the cyclical position of an economy. As we currently observe, 
this may lead countries near recession to reduce their public expenditure or to raise their 
taxes to comply with the pact, which is procyclical. Far from correcting these problems, the 
2011 reforms, which are referred as the “six-pack”, have reinforced the disciplinary function 
of law as well as the threat of sanctions in the event of failure.  
In addition to the stability pact, the member states of the Euro area have adopted in 2012 
a new Fiscal Compact. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Growth (TSCG) introduces 
two new rules imposed on the member states, which are likely to cause deleterious effects on 
public expenditure. The first constraint is the debt brake, with a maximum structural deficit 
of 0.5% of GDP imposed on the signatory countries. The second constraint is the introduction 
of a form of automatism concerning the reduction of sovereign debt, once it exceeds the 
threshold of 60% planned by the SGP. 
The combined effects of the SGP and the TSCG on fiscal policies have been devastating in 
the Euro area: the first one prevents the free play of automatic stabilizers in case of severe 
cyclical downturns; the second prohibits any feasible discretionary stimulus. It is evident 
that a European growth strategy will have to overcome these inconsistent constraints. The 
invocation of exceptional circumstances would temporarily suspend the application of these 
laws, as it has been done for the SGP during the Great Recession.  
It should be recognized that the second obstacle to a European growth policy is Germany 
itself, for several reasons. First of all, for the Euro area, this country has demonstrated some 
of the highest macroeconomic performance.  Therefore, the need for an economic stimulus 
through demand is less important than elsewhere. However, this situation is evolving since 
Germany’s economic growth continues to slow down, driven by weak economic conditions 
in most of its neighboring countries, which are also its export customers. This leads to the 
second reason why Germany appears as a problem: its growth strategy is based on exports 
and is regularly held up as a model. The “internal devaluation” strategy (reduction of 
production costs and prices, especially through lower wages) has been recommended to 
southern European countries – through the so-called Hartz reforms – as it is supposed to be 
Germany’s cornerstone to its current success. This kind of statement contains a twofold 
error, which can ironically be analyzed as a Kantian approach. Firstly, an internal 
devaluation strategy has more chance to succeed if it is performed in isolation, and in a 
context of sustained growth, as it was the case for Germany in the early 2000s. The current 
situation is different: a race to the bottom in costs is simultaneously prescribed to several 
countries, and in a recessionary environment. Secondly, if all Euro area countries had based 
their growth strategy on exports like Germany, we would have to wonder where the net 
importers are. This is the reason why, in the following discussions, we rule out the crisis exit 
strategy based on the “germanization” of the Euro area, which is an unfounded fallacy.  The 
different components of aggregate demand that need to be supported are neither final 
consumption expenditure nor exports, but public and private investment6.  
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These measures to support economic activity are first and foremost, by their very nature, 
short-term measures, designed to strengthen effective growth. From a medium-term 
perspective, priority should be given to investment for several reasons. The first one is that 
investment will ensure future economic gains, as long as selected and financed projects are 
productive. The second reason – which is at least as fundamental – is that the impact of this 
demand component will directly combine short-term objectives to boost economic growth 
with long-term objectives. The last one is related to the proven existence of sectors that lead 
to a public stimulus for structural reasons. 
The Commission has identified several potential areas of intervention (railway networks, 
digital economy, energy, etc.) with a view to support growth and the internal market 
(European Commission, 2012). Rather than perceive them – like European authorities – as a 
way to reinforce competition and to lower internal borders, we believe that collective 
investments and private investments – and consequently short-term demand – should be 
explicitly supported,  as well as, through them, other key factors for future growth such as 
innovation.    
Innovation, a key driver for economic activity 
Highlighted by several studies, we consider innovation a major source of economic 
development in modern times (Veblen, 1898; Schumpeter, 1911). Evolutionary economists 
have understood this in a comprehensive manner, through the concept of innovation 
systems (Freeman,1987), as a network of organizations that creates new processes, 
subsequently used socially and economically, thereby promoting growth, employment, 
competitive positions of nations, and business development.  
A theoretical approach of innovation 
The new endogenous growth theories, developed in the 1980s, have given to innovation a 
central role in their models (Romer,1986; Lucas, 1988; Aghion et al., 1998). Technological 
adaptation and innovation are presented as the key drivers for the long-term growth of an 
economy, and productivity growth is explained by Schumpeter's “creative destruction” 
phenomenon, as innovations have the capacity to accelerate the obsolescence of existing 
technologies and to implement more efficient processes. These new theories have offered a 
better understanding of innovation and its role on a country's economic performance, even 
though their interpretations are often considered simplistic by some economists. Among 
those expressing criticism is Jones (1995), who noticed that although the number of scientists 
and engineers involved in R&D has strongly increased, the productivity growth had not 
been significant. Endogenous growth approaches present a basic vision of the innovation 
process, but have nevertheless highlighted its role within an economy.  
Many studies of the technological frontier as well as of imitation and innovation schemes 
have been substantially extended and have provided us with a better understanding of 
innovation as a whole, combining both institutional and innovation dynamics. The 
relationship between institutions and new processes affects a country's economic 
performance (North, 1998). Structural policies may vary according to whether growth 
regimes are characteristic of a catching-up economy or not, and their impacts on productivity 
   Economic Analysis (2014, Vol. 47, No. 3-4, 3-19)
 
10
growth depend on the distance from the technological frontier, usually symbolized by the 
United States. For an economy that is lagging behind technologically, growth sources are 
indeed capital accumulation and imitation; while more advanced countries enjoy economic 
growth where innovation is the main driver, with intense competition, a flexible labor 
market and a sustained investment in higher education (Acemoglu et al. 2006). An economy 
that is near the technological frontier – like European Union – needs to exploit its innovation 
potential and to invest more in higher education to put the economy back on the path of 
growth (Aghion, Cohen 2004). A supply of skilled labor may induce companies to invest 
more in R&D; conversely, an increase in innovative activities and in the R&D sector 
generally encourages further efforts in education and qualification (Romer,2001). The 
complement between higher education policy and innovation policy could fuel economic 
growth and increase the low level of R&D expenditures in the EU.   
Insufficient incentives to innovate 
After the post-World War II economic expansion, the EU has registered poor 
macroeconomic performance. While it is considered a key to a sustained and sustainable 
growth, the low innovation capacity partly explains these disappointing results. The United 
States and Japan have invested considerably in R&D, while Europe has lagged behind. In the 
1990s, the United States had intensified their efforts to enhance new technological knowledge 
and Japan had invested in basic research, whereas a paradox had emerged among European 
countries. For many years, member states focused on a rather archaic division of labor and 
had been limited to an imitation role, while public authorities should have promoted 
fundamental research in specific centers, and the role of companies should have been to 
innovate, with more organic cooperation between the different actors (Cohen & Lorenzi 
2001). In 1993, the European Commission has highlighted the problems related to 
innovation. Europe has had difficulties to “convert scientific breakthroughs and 
technological achievements into industrial and commercial successes.”  
 
Table 3. Gross Expenditure on Research and Development, GDP ratio 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU 1.82% 1.84% 1.84% 1.91% 2.01% 2.01% 2.05% 2.06% 
France 2.11% 2.11% 2.08% 2.12% 2.27% 2.24% 2.25% 2.26% 
Germany 2.51% 2.54% 2.53% 2.69% 2.82% 2.8% 2.89% 2.92% 
United Kingdom 1.70% 1.72% 1.75% 1.75% 1.82% 1.77% 1.78% 1.72% 
Finland 3.48% 3.48% 3.47% 3.70% 3.94% 3.90% 3.80% 3.55% 
Spain 1.12% 1.20% 1.27% 1.35% 1.39% 1.40% 1.36% 1.30% 
United States 2.49% 2.55% 2.62% 2.76% 2.81% 2.73% 2.67% na 
Japan 1.32% 1.39% 1.40% 1.47% 1.70% 1.76% 1.84% na 
      Source: Eurostat,2005-2012. 
 
Empirical studies have indicated that investments in R&D that lead to patents result in 
significant growth of productivity gains in developed economies (Edworthy,Wallis 2006). 
Under the Europe 2020 initiative, an objective of 3% of GDP to invest in R&D must be 
achieved to reduce the lag behind main competitors. Despite a satisfactory scientific basis, 
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the innovation capacity remains insufficient in Europe. For years, gross expenditure on R&D 
(GERD) has paled in comparison to principal partners without any member state being able 
to reverse the trend. Even though the EU has registered a slight increase of its GERD, the 
effort has not been sufficient to reach the same level of Japan or the United States (see table 
3). Public and private expenditure in higher education has also been relatively low compared 
the United States7, where 41% of the American population aged 25 to 64 have higher 
education degrees, against 44% in Japan and only 25% in the EU11.  
However, these data should be qualified, as there are some disparities between European 
member states. Significant efforts in terms of education, research and innovation have been 
undertaken in Scandinavian countries. Finland, Sweden and Denmark have indeed invested 
in R&D, at higher levels than the United States. According to the OECD, to achieve the 
objectives of the Lisbon strategy, seven hundred thousand more researchers were needed in 
Europe. The gap between the EU and its main competitors is essentially due to the fact that 
the European economy is specialized in the medium-high technology sector, but not in the 
promising new high-technology sectors such as information and communication 
technologies (ICT), electronics, nanotechnologies or biotechnologies.  
The United States has strong capital accumulation in the ICT sector, whereas Europe has 
been focused on employment policies that encourage low-skilled labor, especially through 
reductions in social security contributions on low wage earners. This partly explains low 
gains of labor productivity in Europe relative to the United States. The rapid diffusion of ICT 
across the Atlantic is also due to the important fall in the relative prices of these goods and 
services. Since the 1990s, it appears that the ICT investment has been an important 
determinant of productivity gains. Between 1995 and 2000, ICT investments have induced a 
GDP growth per capita of 0.3% to 1%, according to empirical studies (Jorgenson et al. 2002; 
Cette et al. 2002). Information and communication technologies are tightly linked to 
innovation and help to accelerate the diffusion of information, to encourage networking 
among companies, to reduce geographical distances and to improve communication. The EU 
could benefit from a stronger investment in ICT. This also applies to nanotechnologies, 
biotechnologies and more generally to high technologies. 
The challenge facing the EU remains to redirect and reinforce the innovation system, 
especially through the increase in R&D expenditure and a major effort to invest in high 
technologies and higher education. The economic crisis has created financial obstacles for 
many companies and has led to a decline in R&D investment. It is essential to counteract this 
tendency and to stimulate technical progress in the most promising sectors, as innovation 
can contribute to boosting the economy. While the EU has considerable scientific potential, 
the economic recovery should be accompanied by a more intense diffusion of ICT and by a 
higher level of education, to increase productivity gains. Public support could play a key role 
to reinforce the innovation process among European countries, which have more and more 
difficulties to access sources of funding.  
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The financing of innovation and public intervention 
The financing of innovation presents particular challenges. The difficulty of obtaining a 
complete return on investment is holding investors back from investing in innovation. 
Information asymmetry and moral hazard have a tendency to increase the costs of obtaining 
external financing. Even if this is true for all firms, it is especially so for innovative 
companies (Hall 2005; Hall & Lerner 2010). The financing of innovative companies can be 
provided by standard forms of investment. However, the specific characteristics of 
innovation make it more difficult to access finance, whether they use internal resources or 
financial intermediaries. This is the reason why the intervention of public authorities to 
encourage innovation is essential.  
More than 35% of GERD in Europe come from the public sector. The challenge is the 
articulation of public and private funding. The public sector should primarily finance 
projects that could not find investors through private funding, especially at the beginning of 
the growth cycle. Public intervention should be digressive with the development of the 
project and the authorities cannot be the only actor to finance innovation because unintended 
consequences might appear.  
Direct support provides immediate financial benefits to a company's income statement. 
Such is the case of EU funds operating on two separate budget lines: the framework program 
for research and technological development (FP) and the regional policy (via the European 
regional development fund, the European social fund and the European agricultural 
guarantee fund). Indirect support also encourages a company's development while 
improving its environment (via R&D tax credits, seed funds, business incubators, etc.).  
The European commission has proposed an investment of 88 billion euros for research 
and innovation, as part of the new community framework program “Horizon 2020” which 
assembles all EU funding programs, including the current framework program for research 
and technological development (FP7), the competitiveness and innovation framework 
program (CIP), and the EU contribution to the European institute of innovation and 
technology (EIT). The objective is to stimulate growth and employment, as well as reducing 
administrative burdens. The European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European commission 
have implemented in 2012 a joint initiative to stimulate investment in the sectors of 
transport, energy and ICT. The Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative is fundamentally 
different from the so-called Eurobonds. Project bonds are private debt and are issued by 
project companies to finance large-scale infrastructure projects. Neither the European 
commission nor the member states will therefore issue such bonds. Capital markets are 
considered to be an alternative source of funding and a useful long-term financial instrument 
to trigger innovation in these specific sectors. 
Through financial supports, public intervention promotes and encourages private 
investors, and even more so during an economic decline. Even if the economic literature does 
not help to evaluate the efficiency of public authorities' activities for innovation, the revival 
of economic growth should be facilitated by a public reinforcement on promising sectors 
such as high technologies. Some financial supports – especially direct – should be reassessed. 
However, many public interventions contribute to the development of European small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which stimulates economic growth and the diffusion of 
innovation.  
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The contribution of Small and Medium-Sized enterprises 
In the face of globalization and the acceleration of technological change, businesses with 
fewer than 250 employees are considered key actors in the productive structure and 
contribute substantially to the EU's economic growth. Almost 21 million European 
companies are SMEs – more than 99% of all businesses (apart from the financial sector). 
Europe's future prosperity depends, among other things, on the growth potential of these 
companies. 
The economic role of SMEs in Europe 
Small and medium-sized enterprises lead to a process that replaces incumbent firms by 
new market entrants, potentially more innovative and efficient. This process contributes to 
the productivity growth attributable to technical progress and essentially stems from the 
existing sustainable SMEs. This incumbent-entrant dynamics have an impact on the overall 
productivity. The creation of more productive SMEs that replace the least efficient firms 
largely explains the American productivity growth in the 1990s (Foster et al., 2002). These 
“creative destructions” that can be generated by economic crises help to strengthen the 
productive fabric. Even though there is a less important impact during a recession, 
reinforcing assistance to the creation of innovative SMEs and encouraging the growth of 
existing startup companies could assure a positive result on productivity growth.  
The situations in Europe and the United States do not differ by the number of new 
startups but by their fate (Bartelsman et al., 2005). The establishment of a support plan for 
French SMEs during the 2008 global crisis has improved their financial health. The Economic 
Stimulus Plan helped more than twenty thousand companies and their survival rate has 
reached 89% at the end of June 2011. Despite the considerable growth potential of European 
SMEs, liquidity constraints undeniably lead these startups to bankruptcy.  
SMEs have also helped to provide long-term employment, jobs creation being negatively 
associated with a firm’s size (Birch, 1981; Storey & Johnson 1987; Davis et al., 1998). They 
account for around two thirds of industrial employment in Europe and the Commission has 
estimated that they provided 85% of jobs created between 2002 and 2010. Employment 
creation justifies why SMEs should be supported. However, despite growth potential and job 
creations, European SMEs are facing many challenges. 
Barriers to SME growth 
Structural barriers to the development of SMEs are numerous. One of the most difficult 
obstacles remains the struggle to access external financing sources. This impediment should 
be considered as important as labor market rigidities. Indeed, SMEs play a key role to the 
diffusion of technical progress but have to face the difficulties inherent to financing of 
innovation.  
Venture capital is often chosen to overcome the problem. The financial capital is provided 
to risky investments and should have a positive impact on companies’ growth prospects 
(Engel, 2002). The SME is partly financed out of its own resources and the remaining part is 
provided by a special fund, maintained by external investors and managed by venture 
capitalists, who are supposedly able to reduce information asymmetry. Based on his own 
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business network and his technical as well as market knowledge, the venture capitalist will 
help the company to grow. Its intervention is primordial during the early-stage of the 
company. On the informal market, some intermediaries can finance these startups, such as 
business angels who invest in innovative SMEs with a strong potential. These high net worth 
investors intervene during the seed and start-up stage or during the launch of new products, 
they are particularly motivated by the return on investment and are relatively keen to take 
higher risks.  
Europe is lagging behind concerning the financing of its early-stage companies and 
SMEs’ monitoring. There are near 75 thousand business angels in the EU, as against 265 
thousand in the United States. American SMEs were given the necessary capacity to finance 
and secure their development. Their business angels have rapidly expanded thanks to fiscal 
incentives and deductions of investment losses. In Europe, given the particularly 
heterogeneous nature of the region in terms of capital gains taxes, the efforts concerning 
fiscal incentives for venture capital investments must be accentuated. A reduction in capital 
gains tax would reward investors, at least cost to the government. In the United States, the 
reduction in capital gains has generated a positive and decisive impact on venture capital 
investments and on the degree of risk-taking by business angels (Lerner 1998). Tax credits 
should be limited to more risky investments and oriented towards early-stage SMEs, to 
encourage investors and further venture capital investments. The European Commission has 
tried to support such financing by the establishment of a European system in December 2011, 
to help managers commercialize venture capital funds on a European basis. They will raise 
additional capital and the obstacles related to cross-border transactions will be reduced.  
Crowd-funding could provide an alternative source of financing. This participatory 
approach, which involves individuals with relatively small amounts of money to invest, is 
only an epi-phenomenon in the world of venture capital financing. While American 
congressmen have passed a law to facilitate this type of financing (through the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act), European SMEs are facing restrictive national regulations to the 
development of crowd-funding. However, crowd-funding could be inefficient in selecting 
potential entrepreneurs and could also lead to fraud and misuse. As signals of project quality 
are weak and information asymmetry is exacerbated, investors’ potential returns are unlikely 
to justify the risk taken.   
Other instruments and initiatives could help SMEs to access financing. Examples include 
– but are not limited to – mezzanine capital (subordinated debt) that facilitates access to bank 
credits and supports intangible investment projects, but are poorly developed in Europe. 
Some joint European resources initiatives for SMEs such as “Jeremie” could also improve 
access to financing through structural funds. These initiatives allow member states to invest 
in venture capital funds, guarantee funds or loan funds. 
Given these financial constraints, European SMEs barely reach the critical size to export, 
and only one in five is operating internationally. Challenged by the fierce foreign 
competition, an expansion abroad would support the long-run viability of a business, but 
would also boost economic growth and strengthen competitiveness. Exportation is often 
considered as too expensive or risky and many SMEs do not expect to internationalize their 
activities. However, German SMEs have the capacity to reach the critical size required. The 
German Mittelstand – and its many medium-sized SMEs – is frequently perceived as a model 
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to follow and has enhanced the reputation of the “made in Germany” seal of quality thanks 
to the enviable performance of its industries. While French and British SMEs were affected 
by the global financial crisis, Germany’s prosperity owes a great deal to the Mittelstand and 
to the strength of its large number of medium-sized enterprises. Without actually leading to 
a German-inspired model based on export-dependence, public and private investments 
would enable more European SMEs to internationalize their activities. Because several Asian 
countries have experienced an economic take-off, German SMEs has become highly 
specialized, especially in high value-added capital goods, in sectors such as automotive, 
chemistry, precision engineering and electrical engineering. The Mittlestand is also notable 
for – and is playing a pioneering role in – the transition to a resource-efficient and low-
carbon economy. Therefore, these SMEs have become the essential suppliers of major 
industrial groups and have benefited from a strong international demand.  
Think small first: an SME-friendly environment 
To tackle the obstacles impeding the development of European SMEs, a more suitable 
environment must be provided. Because growth potential and employment creation in the 
European industry depends on the dynamism of its companies, more efforts are required to 
encourage the establishment, development and internationalization of SMEs. In this regard, 
the adoption of the “Small Business Act” for Europe in December 2008 was undoubtedly a 
useful action plan. 
Taking its inspiration from the American Small Business Act, the recent initiatives aim to 
contribute to the achievement of ambitious objectives targeted by the Europe 2020 strategy. 
To boost economic growth, the European Commission and its member states are committed 
to establish several political and legislative measures of which one of the main goals is to 
support SMEs and reduce the obstacles that hinder their development and restrict job 
creation. With a 1.1 billion euros budget over the 2007-2013 period, the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Program (CIP) facilitates venture capital investments and provides 
loan guarantees for SMEs. According to the Commission, each SME with a guaranteed loan 
could create an average of 1.2 jobs, and 300,000 SMEs have benefit from the CIP financial 
instruments by 2013. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has contributed to the development of SMEs by 
releasing 40 billion euros of loans to 210,000 companies between 2008 and 2011, to help 
innovative enterprises and to implement the Lisbon strategy. The central role of the EIB in 
raising funds to finance European SMEs – and by extension innovative companies – needs to 
be strengthened to meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 program. 
Special emphasis should be given to Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) to 
finance SMEs in their startup and growth phases. By implementing a European supervisory 
board (with a public-private team) and with some help from the EIB, business angels and the 
financial market, it should be possible to raise enough funds to invest over several years in 
the most dynamic SMEs. Some improvements have been observed in public procurement. 
SMEs have less administrative burdens since the introduction of the Small Business Act 
(SBA) and are encouraged to work together in order to offer joint bids.  
The main challenge for SMEs lies in the diversity of national and local environments and 
on the principle of subsidiarity. Even though all EU member states recognize the importance 
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of the SBA and its rapid implementation, the countries have chosen various methods of 
implementation and obtained different results. Access to financing and to public 
procurement is generally facilitated but the future of the SBA will depend on the 
determination of European countries to follow the Commission’s initiatives. An enhanced 
governance of the SBA should provide the expected results.  
The global economic environment has dramatically changed in the past few years and the 
efforts to encourage the creation, development and internationalization of SMEs must form 
the heart of the new integrated industrial policy of the EU. Member states should take into 
account the needs of SMEs in their economic policies in order for the European industry to 
remain a driver of economic growth.   
Concluding remarks: European Union must take advantage of its market size 
Europe does not have a true top-down industrial policy such as the one endorsed by 
France in the 1980s. The Union is pursuing instead a bottom-up industrial policy inspired by 
the German Standortpolitik8. Its initiatives towards SMEs provide an eloquent illustration. 
However, sectoral actions to strengthen the productive fabric in Europe remain exceptional. 
Galileo is one of the few industrial projects that are truly supported by the EU.  
By contrast, the Union does not interfere in sectors where the combined effect of 
increasing returns (or spatial externalities) and the size of the European internal market 
could be a decisive advantage for the competitiveness of manufacturers. Indeed, in 
productive activities where economies of scale are real (besides aeronautics, some energy-
related sectors, railway equipment, some aspects of the new green economy, etc.), a policy of 
“European industrial champions” could succeed. Given its importance – often among the 
main international priorities – the single market can transform a European champion into a 
worldwide industrial leader. If not, it will still be a significant player on markets that are 
only allowing a few large competitors. 
The European pusillanimity is often involved and blamed, in several matters. Firstly, 
Europe’s major competitors – and especially China – are using this type of leverage. The 
Chinese case and its numerous successes have even largely contributed to the recent 
rehabilitation of the industrial policy, at least in emerging countries (Rodrik,2004). Secondly, 
as pointed out by Aghion et alii (2011), the question is no longer to know whether or not the 
industrial policy should have a sector-based component, but to understand how to 
implement it with a maximum efficiency and a minimum of detrimental effects. Finally, the 
structural economic phenomena are undoubtedly related to the classical economics idea that 
the market is better than the state at making the right investment choices. The environmental 
crisis or the issues of energy mix are significant examples.  
In Europe, the competition policy has so far taken precedence over the industrial policy. 
The merger control policy is indeed occasionally constraining the creation of large 
companies. The concern to limit market power prevails over the development of the 
productive apparatus. Similarly, public procurement cannot be used selectively within the 
EU, as was the case in France and as it is still occurring among the major competitors (United 
                                                     
8
 Literally “industrial production policy”, dealing with the competitiveness of the “made in 
Germany”. 
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States, Japan, China, etc.). Submitted by the European commission, the recent request for 
international reciprocity concerning the opening of public procurement cannot hide the 
naivety (related to neo-liberal beliefs) that is characteristic of the EU policy in this matter 
over the past twenty-five years.  
To a certain extent, a similar idea is behind the state aid control. State aid is indeed 
prohibited by the Treaties, but can be compatible with the logic of the internal market (article 
107 TFEU). The real circumstances authorized by the Commission remain unclear. The article 
107-3 stipulates that the “aid to promote the execution of an important project of common 
European interest” and the “aid to promote the economic development” are potentially 
permissible. It seems that a legal uncertainty could be found to promote an active industrial 
policy, with sectoral State aid.    
Moreover, industrial policy and competition policy are less antagonistic than what the 
consensus of the past twenty-five years was suggesting (Aghion et al., 2011). In particular, 
some state aid could target specific sectors, without favoring one company over another, as 
long as the sector concerned has not reached a high degree of concentration. The risk of 
“cherry picking” (where incumbent companies are favored by the political action) is 
therefore limited.   
The EU has also identified – as part of the Europe 2020 strategy – several promising 
sectors, considered as decisive for the future competitiveness. This includes, in particular, the 
digital economy, biotechnologies, photonics, nanotechnologies, etc. Consequences still have 
to be drawn from state aid issues, particularly when fixed production costs are high (and 
therefore important scale effects). These state aid measures would benefit from a European 
approach, because all attempts by member states to give advantage to a local company will 
be avoided, while the pertinent scale is the internal market as a whole.  
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Evropski rast: kriza izlazne strategije  
 
 
REZIME – Dok se Evropska unija suočava sa sve jačom recesijom, propraćenom posledicama 
globalne finansijske krize iz 2008. godine, pokazuje se da je više nego potrebna podrška privrednim 
aktivnostima. Primarne brige zemalja članica se zasnivaju u nastojanju da povećaju konkurentnost, 
zaposlenost, inovacije i pomoć malim i srednjim preduzećima, kako bi podstakle ekonomski rast u 
kratkom ili dugom roku. U tom smislu ovaj rad najpre ukazuje na to da je apsolutno neophodna 
privremena podrška privrednim aktivnostima, a detaljno su i razmotreni mogući aranžmani. Pored 
toga, treba staviti akcenat na inovacije jer one igraju ključnu ulogu za povećanje ekonomskog rasta. 
Posebna pažnja je usmerena na sektor malih i srednjih preduzeća, njihov potencijalni uticaj na 
produktivnost i finansijske poteškoće. U zaključnom delu smo se fokusirali na veličinu evropskog 
tržišta i istakli smo netrpeljivost između politike konkurentnosti i industrijske politike. 
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